The right of reply under the European Convention on Human Rights: an analysis of Eker v Turkey App no 24016/05 (ECtHR, 24 October 2017) by Hempel, Felix
Acknowledgement: The Version of Record of this manuscript has been 
published and is available in the Journal of Media Law, 3 April 2018, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17577632.2018.1458403 
 
The right of reply under the European Convention on Human Rights – 
An analysis of Eker v Turkey App no 24016/05 (ECtHR, 24 October 
2017) 
Felix Hempel 
Law School, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich NR4 7TJ, 
England 
Email: F.Hempel@uea.ac.uk 
Felix Hempel is a PhD candidate at the University of East Anglia Law School 
 
The right of reply under the European Convention on Human Rights – 
An analysis of Eker v Turkey App no 24016/05 (ECtHR, 24 October 
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This article analyses the latest judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
dealing with the right of reply. The court held that the compulsion for a publisher 
to print a reply to an editorial he had written and published in his newspaper did 
not violate his fundamental rights. Exploring the key findings, this case note sets 
out the decision’s wider implications for freedom of expression, the right to a fair 
trial, and the right to a private life. Particularly, the case comes to significant 
conclusions that might result in the widening of the admissible content of a reply 
and an extension of the scope of the remedy. By reinterpreting the normative 
foundations of the right of reply, it also combines disparate approaches from pre-
vious case law. Thus, this case comment highlights both the ruling’s practical 
implications and potential repercussions for future application of domestic and 
international law on the right of reply. 
Keywords: right of reply; freedom of expression, right to a fair trial, right to a 
private life, European Court of Human Rights 
1. Introduction 
On 24 October 2017, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the com-
pulsion for a publisher to print a reply to an editorial he had written and published in his 
newspaper did not violate his fundamental rights under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).1 One of the key issues in the case was whether the lack of a 
public hearing during the domestic proceedings led to an unfair trial. In addition, the 
court examined whether the interference with the publisher’s freedom of expression 
resulting from the right of reply was proportionate.2 
                                                
1 Eker v Turkey App no 24016/05 (ECtHR, 24 October 2017). 
2 So far, this judgment is only available in French. The registrar of the ECtHR has published a 
summary in English (24 October 2017), available at <http://bit.ly/2ywPBBm> accessed 20  
Reinforcing and combining the findings of previous case law,3 this judgment highlights 
that the right of reply can be employed not merely to ensure the retraction of incorrect 
facts but also to offer an opportunity to vindicate reputational rights. Further, it 
acknowledges that the remedy enhances public discourse in general. By doing so, the 
ECtHR combines disparate approaches from previous case law and reinterpreted the 
normative foundations of the right of reply. In addition, the court provided significant 
guidance regarding the admissible scope of a right of reply, and the extent of procedural 
guarantees to be provided in court proceedings under the ECHR. Thus, the decision has 
wider implications for the remedy’s impact on freedom of expression, the right to a fair 
trial, and the right to a private life. More specifically, it concerns the balance between 
the (editorial) freedom of the press, the public interest in access to accurate and plural 
information, and the reputational rights of a person affected by a statement made in the 
media. 
Historically, the value of a right of reply has been the subject of controversy in 
academia and in practice.4 As the obligation to print a reply interferes with the publish-
er’s freedom to determine what to publish in his or her newspaper, the remedy is often 
seen as an inevitable restriction on the freedom of the press with a ‘chilling effect’ on 
                                                                                                                                          
March 2018. 
3 Ediciones Tiempo SA v Spain App no 13010/87 (ECtHR, 12 July 1989); Melnychuk v Ukraine  
App no 28743/03 (ECtHR, 5 July 2005); Kaperzyński v Poland App no 43206/07 (ECtHR, 3  
April 2012). This is discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 below. 
4 See for example: N.Y. Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); Miami Herald Publish 
ing Co v Tornillo 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Andrew Martin, ‘The right of reply in England’ in Mar- 
tin Löffler (ed), The right of reply in Europe (C.H. Beck 1974) 34–40; Report of the Committee  
on Privacy and Related Matters Cmd 1102 (London: HMSO, 1990) 44; Alastair Mullis and 
Andrew Scott, ‘Tilting at Windmills: The Defamation Act 2013’ (2014) 77(1) MLR 107–108. 
editorial independence.5 On the other hand, a right of reply enables an individual or 
organisation affected by facts or comments made in the press to publish their own 
viewpoint in the same forum.6 Thus, the remedy is considered as the guarantee of an 
‘equal fighting chance’ and the ‘right to be heard’ for those who are in a weaker posi-
tion than the media.7 This position stems from the assumption than an individual cannot, 
as a rule, counter the news media with the prospect of the same level of publicity.8 
Striking a balance between these interests is a recurring theme of the right of reply in 
general and, more specifically, of the present case. 
After briefly setting out the facts of the judgement, this case comment highlights 
how the court reached its ruling regarding the key procedural and substantive issues 
noted above. It then focuses on why this decision is significant, how it fits in with pre-
vious case law, and what it adds to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. To do so, the analy-
sis explores how the right of reply has been conceptualised in previous case law and 
how this has changed over time. Lastly, the article considers the ruling’s potential im-
pact on future applications concerning the right of reply under the ECHR. 
                                                
5 For a rationale of the arguments, see, for example, Charles Danziger, 'The right of reply in the  
US and Europe' [1986] 19(1) NYU Journal of International Law and Politic 176–180; Eric Bar- 
endt, Freedom of Speech (OUP 2005) 422–426; Stephen Gardbaum, ‘A reply to the right of  
reply’ [2008] 76(4) George Washington Law Review 1065–1072; Andras Koltay, ‘The Right of  
Reply in a European Comparative Perspective’ [2013] 54(1) Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies  
73–89. For further discussion, see below. 
6 The exact scope and requirements of a right of reply depend on the provision of each member  
state. 
7 See the analysis of the judgment below. 
8 See for example: David Björgvinsson, ‘The right of reply’ in Josep Casadevall (ed), Freedom  
of Expression: Essays in Honour of Nicolas Bratza (WLP 2012) 164. 
2. Facts 
The case concerns an editorial, published by Mustafa Eker in his newspaper Bizim Ka-
radeniz, circulated in Sinop, Turkey.9 In his contribution, Mr Eker criticised the local 
journalists’ association. He alleged that particular actions of the association contravened 
the organisation’s main objective, and that it was no longer fit for its intended purpose. 
The association demanded the publication of a reply in the newspaper, but Mr Eker de-
nied this request. 
Subsequently, the president of the association applied to the local Magistrate’s 
Court, seeking an order for the reply to be published. Both the domestic court of first 
instance and the appellate court ordered Mr Eker to print the reply. These proceedings 
were held without a public hearing involving the parties. Ultimately, Mr. Eker had no 
option but to publish the reply in his newspaper. 
Following these events, Mr Eker applied to the ECtHR on 9 June 2005. He 
claimed that the lack of a hearing had resulted in a violation of his rights to a fair trial 
(Article 6), the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8), and the right to an 
effective remedy (Article 13). The court was also asked to consider whether the com-
pulsion to print the reply in his newspaper had amounted to a violation of his right to 
freedom of expression under Article 10. 
3. The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
In its judgment, the ECtHR adopted two lines of reasoning. First, it examined whether 
the lack of a hearing had resulted in a violation of Convention rights. Being the ‘master 
of the legal characterisation’ of the facts of the case,10 the court decided to conduct this 
                                                
9 Eker (n 1) para 5–13. 
10 ibid, para 18. 
investigation solely from the point of view of the right to a fair trial, applying Article 
6(1). Subsequently, the judges analysed whether the obligation to publish the reply had 
violated Mr Eker’s freedom of expression under Article 10. 
3.1 Did the lack of a public hearing result in an unfair trial? 
As neither of the domestic courts had held an oral hearing, the ECtHR investigated 
whether this resulted in an unfair trial. The judges, consistent with previous case law,11 
reiterated that despite the importance of the public character of the proceedings, the 
obligation to hold a public hearing is not absolute.12 Instead, this should be examined on 
a case-by-case basis.13 
Consequently, in cases that raise no question of credibility or do not give rise to 
a sufficient controversy over the facts, the ECtHR stressed that courts may decide such 
disputes in a fair and reasonable manner solely by the submissions made by the par-
ties.14 Recalling that news is a perishable commodity and even a short delay in its publi-
cation might well deprive it of all its value and interest,15 the court applied this rule to 
the facts of the present case. Ultimately, the judges found that the legal issues had not 
been especially complex. Hence, they did not require oral presentation of evidence.16 
Therefore, the ECtHR did not consider the domestic court’s conclusions or pro-
cedures to be arbitrary or patently unreasonable. Rather, the judges emphasised that the 
                                                
11 See, for example, Jussila v Finland App no 73053/01 (ECtHR, 23 November 2006) para 41. 
12 Eker (n 1) para 24. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid, para 30. 
16 ibid, para 31. 
promptness in the present case17 was a necessary and justifiable element of these pro-
ceedings to enable untruthful information published in the media to be contested. 18 Ac-
cording to the ECtHR, this swiftness also ensures a plurality of opinions in the exchange 
of ideas on matters of general interest.19 
Concluding, the judges stressed that the applicant had still been able to present 
his arguments against publication of the reply to the domestic court in writing.20 Hence, 
the ECtHR unanimously held that the lack of a public hearing did not violate Article 
6(1). 
3.2 Does the right of reply endanger freedom of expression? 
As the Turkish courts had limited the editor’s right to determine the content of his 
newspaper, the ECtHR examined whether the compulsion to print a reply had interfered 
with Mr Eker’s rights under Article 10 of the Convention, which guarantees freedom of 
expression. The judges found that the domestic court order had restricted the editorial 
power of the publisher to decide whether to include contributions from individuals in 
his newspaper.21 Therefore, this interfered with the applicant’s freedom of expression. 
However, under Article 10(2), the exercise of this right may be subject to lawful 
restrictions. Consequently, the court, consistent with previous case law,22 examined 
                                                
17 Right of reply proceedings under Turkish law require national courts to rule within three days.  
This is shorter than average compared to other countries. 
18 Eker (n 1) para 30. 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid, para 45. 
22 For the general principles on freedom of expression, the court referred to Morice v France  
App no 29369/10 (ECtHR, 23 April 2015) para 124–125.
whether the obligation to print the reply had been prescribed by law, had pursued a le-
gitimate aim, was necessary in a democratic society, and was proportionate to the aim. 
Reiterating that the interference with the publisher’s freedom of expression had 
been prescribed by Turkish law,23 the court focused on the aim of the reply in the pre-
sent case. The ECtHR held that the remedy is ‘intended to afford all persons the possi-
bility of protecting themselves against certain statements or opinions disseminated by 
the mass media that are likely to be injurious to their private life, honour and dignity’.24  
Thus, by giving the affected association the ability to defend themselves against 
allegations in the press, the restriction of Mr Eker’s rights was found to have the legiti-
mate aim of protecting the ‘reputation or rights of others’ as set out in Article 10(2).25 
Significantly, the court also stressed that the publication of the reply enabled the affect-
ed journalist association to exercise their own right to freedom of expression.26 Conse-
quently, the ECtHR emphasised that the right of reply is a necessary guarantee of the 
pluralism of information, which must be respected in a democratic society.27 It thus 
considered the remedy addressed not only the social need to allow false information to 
be challenged, but also to ensure a plurality of opinions.28 
However, reinforcing previous case law,29 the judges highlighted that a limita-
tion of the applicant’s freedom of expression must also be proportionate to the aim pur-
sued. As there had been no obligation for the publisher to amend the original article, and 
                                                
23 Article 32 of the Turkish Constitution and Article 14 of the Turkish Press Act No. 5187. 
24 Eker (n 1) para 47. 
25 ibid, para 47, 50. 
26 ibid, para 45, 46. 
27 ibid, para 48. 
28 ibid, para 43. 
29 Karácsony and Others v Hungary App nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13 (ECtHR, 17 May 2016)  
para 132. 
he still had the opportunity to re-publish his version of the facts, the court found that the 
requirement to publish the reply was proportionate.30 Hence, the ECtHR, unanimously 
concluded that the order to print a reply did not amount to a violation of the applicant’s 
freedom of expression. 
4. Commentary and analysis 
This section considers the significance of the judgement for our understanding of the 
normative foundation, content and scope of the right of reply, as well as the procedural 
implications of the ruling for domestic courts when making a right of reply order. To 
date, this is only the third time that a newspaper has claimed that an obligation to pub-
lish a reply under domestic law violates the ECHR.  
4.1 The normative foundation for a right of reply under the ECHR prior to Eker 
In the first of these cases Ediciones Tiempo SA v Spain,31 dating back to 1989, a news-
paper claimed an unlawful violation of their convention rights caused by the compul-
sion to print a reply. The European Commission of Human Rights (‘the Commission’)32 
saw the main aim of the right of reply as protecting ‘private life, honour or dignity’ 
against ‘certain statements or opinions, disseminated by the mass media.’33 Significant-
ly, these rights are guaranteed under Article 8.34 Despite briefly mentioning the reme-
dy’s importance in serving the public's right to information and the pluralism of infor-
                                                
30 Eker (n 1) para 51. 
31 App no 13010/87 (ECtHR, 12 July 1989). 
32 Prior to becoming obsolete with the restructuring of the ECtHR in 1998, applications under  
the ECHR were preliminarily examined by the European Commission of Human Rights. 
33 Ediciones Tiempo (n 31) p 253. 
34 Ronan Ó Fathaigh, ‘The Recognition of a Right of Reply under the European  
Convention' (2012) 4(2) Journal of Media Law 325. 
mation,35 the Commission did not determine whether a right of reply is a part of the 
freedom of expression of an individual.36 
Remarkably, in the subsequent case of Melnychuk v Ukraine,37 where an indi-
vidual applied to the ECtHR after a newspaper had rejected his demand to publish his 
reply and the domestic courts had not compelled them to do so, the court deviated from 
these previous conclusions. Instead of deriving the right of reply from Article 8, the 
judges characterised it as an aspect of the freedom of speech of the complainant.38 Not 
even mentioning Ediciones Tiempo, the court highlighted that the remedy ‘falls within 
the scope of Article 10 of the Convention’.39 According to Melnychuk, the basis for this 
finding was the need to be able to contest untruthful information, and the need to ensure 
a plurality of opinions in literary and political debate.40 These arguments had not been 
brought forward in Ediciones Tiempo. 
Seven years later, a newspaper again claimed that an obligation to publish a re-
ply under domestic law violated the ECHR. In Kaperzyński v Poland,41 the ECtHR re-
called Melnychuk’s conclusions that the right of reply ‘falls within the scope of Article 
10’. Again, Kaperzyński failed to refer to Ediciones Tiempo and its findings regarding 
Article 8. Instead, the court emphasised that the remedy has the purpose of contesting 
untruthful information and ensuring the plurality of opinions.42 
                                                
35 Ediciones Tiempo (n 31) p 254. 
36 Regarding Ediciones Tiempo see also: John Hayes, ‘The Right to Reply: A Conflict of  
Fundamental Rights’ (2004) 37 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 574. 
37 App no 28743/03 (ECtHR, 5 July 2005). 
38 Andras Koltay (n 5) 76. 
39 Melnychuk (n 37) para 2 
40 ibid. 
41 App no 43206/07 (ECtHR, 3 April 2012). 
42 ibid, para 66. 
In the third case, Marunic v Croatia,43 the ECtHR very briefly touched upon the norma-
tive basis of the right of reply being mainly concerned with the issue of whether the 
dismissal of the applicant over statements she had made in the media had been lawful. 
By simply reiterating that the remedy ‘falls within the scope of Article 10’, the court 
came to the same conclusions as Kaperzyński and Melnychuk.44 
4.2. What is the right of reply’s normative foundation according to Eker and 
why is this significant? 
Since 1989, no ECtHR judgment has derived the right of reply from Article 8. This has 
caused uncertainty over whether this approach has been abandoned and whether rooting 
the remedy solely in Article 10 should be seen as settled case law.  
Eker makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the right’s norma-
tive foundation. Instead of placing the remedy within either Article 8 or Article 10, Eker 
convincingly establishes that the protective purpose of the right of reply is (at least) 
twofold. By holding that the right has its normative foundation in both Article 8 and 
Article 10, it combines the two approaches from previous case law.45 According to 
Eker, a right of reply is intended to enable any individual to protect him or herself from 
information or opinions, disseminated by means of mass communication, which in-
fringe the claimant’s private life, honour and dignity,46 as well as reputation.47 Though 
not expressly noted in the ruling, the right to reputation has been recognised as a part of 
                                                
43 App no 51706/11 (ECtHR, 28 March 2017). 
44 ibid, para 50. 
45 In Eker, the ECtHR refers to all judgments mentioned in Section 4.1 apart from Marunic (n  
43). 
46 Eker (n 1) para 47. 
47 ibid, para 47, 50. 
the right to private life under Article 8 since 2004.48 Most importantly, this judgement is 
the first to reiterate the conclusions made in Ediciones Tiempo.49  
However, drawing upon the rulings of both Melnychuk and Kaperzyński,50 the 
court went beyond reliance solely on Article 8. The judges added that the right of reply 
is needed, not only to allow false information to be challenged, but also to ensure a plu-
rality of opinions, particularly in areas of general interest.51 Thus, it is part of an indi-
vidual’s freedom of expression.52 Consequently, the ECtHR emphasised that the publi-
cation of the journalists’ association’s reply in Mr Eker’s newspaper concerned the ex-
ercise of their own freedom of expression under Article 10.53 
Hence, Eker reinterprets the normative foundation of the remedy. This ‘two-
pillar theory’ suggests that a right of reply requires more than merely the retraction of 
incorrect facts and offers an opportunity to vindicate reputational rights. Further, it 
acknowledges that the remedy enhances public discourse in general, whilst ensuring 
plural, reliable media coverage. Thus, after almost 20 years of uncertainty of whether 
the right of reply also derives from Article 8 or if rooting the remedy solely in Article 
10 should be seen as settled case law, the court introduced a new interpretation, which 
clarifies that both options are viable. 
These findings are likely to have repercussions for future applications concern-
ing the right of reply. Ultimately, one may conclude from the judgment that individuals 
can claim protection under Article 8 through a right of reply in relation to allegations, 
                                                
48 Radio France v France App no 53984/00 (ECtHR, 30 March 2004) para 31. 
49 Eker (n 1) para 47. 
50 The court did not refer to Marunic (n 43). 
51 Eker (n 1) para 43. 
52 ibid, para 43, 45, 46. 
53 ibid, para 45, 46. 
regardless of the truth or falsity of the statement complained about. This strengthens the 
position of the affected person against the editorial freedom of a publisher to determine 
what (or what not) to publish. Hence, it can be seen as a reinforcement of the argument 
that the remedy is crucial to guarantee an ‘equal fighting chance’ and a ‘right to be 
heard’ for a person who is in a weaker position than the media.54 
Nevertheless, the court’s finding that the right of reply is, inter alia, justified by 
the protection of the affected person’s private life can be criticised. Replying to a state-
ment in the press will not usually result in private matters remaining private – it might 
even cause the opposite effect. As the affected person will necessarily add his or her 
view to the already existing story published in the media, it becomes possible that even 
more people will take notice of the original allegation.55 Achieving similar publicity as 
the statement that gave rise to the complaint is one of the key elements of the right of 
reply, in order to establish a level playing field between the individual and the publish-
er. Thus, the remedy allows a claimant the opportunity to ‘set the record straight’,56 but 
is unlikely to keep information about the affected person out of the public eye. 
4.3 The judgement’s controversial findings regarding the content of the right of 
reply 
In Eker, the ECtHR had to decide whether the reply was an appropriate answer to the 
newspaper’s statements, despite including possibly disparaging remarks about the ap-
                                                
54 David Björgvinsson (n 8) 164. 
55 For an analysis of the ‘Streisand Effect’, see Rebecca Moosavian, 'Jigsaws and curiosities: the  
unintended consequences of misuse of private information injunctions’ [2016] 21(4) Communi- 
cations Law 104–115. 
56 Andrew Scott, ‘‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’: the autopoietic inanity of the single meaning  
rule’ in Andrew Kenyon (ed), Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (CUP 2013) 53. 
plicant.57 The same issue, but with a different outcome, had been decided once before. 
In Melnychuk, the court found the application inadmissible because the reply went be-
yond stating the point of view of the affected person and contained criticism of the pub-
lisher.58 In contrast, the court in Eker did not object to the fact that the reply contained 
criticism of the complainant and insinuations as to his professional integrity.59 This was 
the case even though the journalists’ association did not have to prove the veracity of 
claims in the reply. 
Eker is thus the first ECtHR judgement to hold a reply containing criticism 
against the publisher admissible. Hence, the ruling opens the door for future replies to 
do the same. The court argued that the tone of the reply in the present case was ‘sub-
stantially similar to the original contribution’.60 Therefore, it seemed reasonable to al-
low the reply.  
Again, this finding reinforces the argument that the right of reply is crucial to 
guarantee an ‘equal fighting chance’ and a ‘right to be heard’ for a person who is in a 
weaker position than the media. Further, the ECtHR justified its decision by stressing 
that the right of reply did not obligate the newspaper to amend the original article, or 
prohibit them from republishing their version of the facts.61 This approach clearly seeks 
to establish a level playing field between the rights and interests of the publisher and the 
affected person. Balancing out both positions is a recurring theme of the right of reply. 
                                                
57 Eker (n 1) para 48, 49. 
58 Melnychuk (n 37) para 2. In this case, the reply in question called the publisher of the news 
paper a ‘subhuman’ and a ‘member’ (член) [i.e. a slang term for a part of the male anatomy].  
Further, it gave a confusing account of the publisher’s political and business activities. 
59 Eker (n 1) para 48. 
60 ibid, para 50; see also (although not cited by Eker) Saliyev v Russia App no 35016/03  
(ECtHR, 21 October 2010) para 52. 
61 Eker (n 1) para 51. 
However, the judges failed to set out clear criteria on where to draw a line, as they did 
not specify what exactly renders a criticism admissible. Considering that the criticism 
was held admissible because it was ‘substantially similar to the original contribution’, 
this raises the question as to whether, and, if so, to what extent a reply can criticise the 
publisher. However, this article argues that allowing criticism in a reply goes too far as 
it results in follow-up questions that make balancing the individual’s and publisher’s 
rights even more complicated. For example, can a reply include an inaccurate statement 
of facts as long as the original statement did so too? Would the ECtHR have held the 
reply admissible if the remarks had gone beyond Mr Eker’s professional integrity and 
concerned his personal life?  
By failing to address these questions, the court missed the opportunity to estab-
lish clear guidelines for the affected person, the publisher, and the domestic courts. 
Most importantly, the decision did not take into account the publisher’s discretionary 
‘editorial power’ to decide whether to publish articles, comments or letters from indi-
viduals.62 Therefore, the ruling might support the argument of those who claim that a 
right of reply has the potential to have a ‘chilling effect’ on a newspaper’s editorial 
freedom,63 which could result in them publishing fewer controversial news or stories.64 
In the United Kingdom, this potential ‘chilling effect’ and the danger that it could lead 
                                                
62 Eker (n 1) para 45. 
63 See Stephen Gardbaum (n 5) 1068, who points out that due to the lack of empirical research 
the existence of the chilling effect is difficult to prove. 
64 Regarding the view that the right of reply has a ‘chilling effect’ see N.Y. Times Co. v Sullivan,  
376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); Miami Herald Publishing Co v Tornillo 418 U.S. 241 (1974). For a  
contradictory view, see Charles Danziger (n 5) 176–180. 
to a ‘paralysation’ of the press has historically formed one of the main arguments 
against the implementation of a statutory reply.65  
4.4 Court proceedings involving the right of reply under the ECHR 
Another significant finding in Eker was the unanimous decision that the lack of a hear-
ing in the domestic courts did not cause an unfair trial.66 Significantly, this is the first 
time the ECtHR has reached this conclusion regarding the right of reply. Despite being 
raised in Melnychuk,67 the court did not comment on whether it agreed with the claim 
that the domestic proceedings regarding the right of reply interfered with the applicant’s 
right to a fair trial. 
As mentioned above, the court in Eker stressed that right of reply proceedings in 
general do not require an oral hearing. Thus, by highlighting that swift proceedings are 
crucial for the effectiveness of the right of reply, the court underlined the immediate and 
prompt nature of this remedy. In their decision, the judges convincingly acknowledged 
that right of reply procedures, in general, are not concerned with the veracity of allega-
tions. This was supported by the argument that right of reply procedures usually take 
place independently of any subsequent defamation proceedings in which the veracity of 
any claims may be carried out in strict compliance with the adversarial principle.68 This 
is inevitable, as examining the truth or falsity of the statement complained about would 
require an evaluation of the evidence provided by the parties and more time. Instead, 
                                                
65 See for example: HC Deb 10 March 1993 Standing Committee F, vol 8 cc 72. 
66 Regarding the right of reply. 
67 Melnychuk (n 37) para 1: As the applicant failed to substantiate his claim, the complaint un 
der Article 6 was held manifestly ill-founded. See also Vitrenko and others v Ukraine App no.  
23510/02 (ECtHR, 16 December 2008), where the court found the claim that the domestic  
courts were impartial as inadmissible. 
68 Eker (n 1) para 28. 
right of reply proceedings usually aim, at this stage, to strike a balance between the 
rights of the affected person and the publisher.69 Although not expressly mentioned by 
the court, these arguments pick up on the ruling in Ediciones Tiempo, where the Com-
mission held that the veracity of the reply could not be checked in any great detail.70  
This might have wider implications for the right of reply on the internet.71 In to-
day’s fast-moving media landscape, lengthy proceedings lead to the danger that the 
challenged statement will be long forgotten by the time a related trial is competed (also 
known as the ‘fade factor’). Therefore, only the immediate realisation of an ‘equal 
fighting chance’ can effectively fulfil this right’s normative purpose. Ultimately, this 
again strengthens the position of the affected person who wants a reply. Additionally, it 
confirms that the procedural bar for interfering with the discretionary ‘editorial’ power 
of a publisher is rather low in the context of a right of reply. 
4.5 Extending the scope? 
Reiterating Ediciones Tiempo,72 the court emphasised that a right of reply is not only 
intended to enable any individual to protect himself against factual statements, but also 
against opinions disseminated by means of mass communication.73 The ECtHR justified 
the extension to opinions by referring to the need to protect the individual’s rights guar-
anteed under Article 8.74  
                                                
69 Right of reply proceedings are, like in Eker, often only of summary nature. For example, see s  
926 German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO). 
70 Ediciones Tiempo (n 31) p 254. 
71 See Section 4.6.3 below. 
72 Ediciones Tiempo (n 31), p 247. 
73 Eker (n 1) para 47. 
74 ibid. 
Ultimately, this aspect of the ruling is remarkable for several reasons and it provides 
another example why the court’s decision to also derive the right of reply from Article 8 
is significant. First, these findings contradict the recommendation made by the Council 
of Europe Committee of Ministers in 2004, which recommended to leave ‘the dissemi-
nation of opinions and ideas […] outside the scope’ of a right of reply.75 Second, 
whereas in some ECHR jurisdictions a right of reply against an opinion has been around 
for a while,76 other member states have expressly limited the scope of this remedy to 
factual statements.77 On the one hand, extending the right of reply to value judgements 
could possibly lead to ‘flooding’ the press with replies. This could result not only in a 
limitation on the freedom of the press, but also in the right of reply becoming ‘a dull 
and overused’ remedy.78 Additionally, it could create a cost burden for the publisher and 
possibly a loss of profits.79 On the other hand, a wider scope could enhance the shaping 
of public opinion rather than holding it back and guarantee an efficient and comprehen-
sive protection of personal rights.80 So far, there has been no application claiming a vio-
lation of the ECHR due to a too-narrow scope of a right of reply provision. However, it 
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would be interesting to see how the ECtHR deals with an applicant who alleges a viola-
tion of his convention rights because the domestic right of reply excluded opinions and 
was limited to assertions of facts. Considering the findings in Eker, this claim is likely 
to be successful. 
4.6 A positive obligation on the United Kingdom to provide a right of reply? 
4.6.1 In the printed press? 
Whether there is a positive obligation on states to provide a right of reply for a person 
affected by statements in the press has been subject to academic debate.81 Ultimately, 
there is support for the view that the ECtHR conceded that this obligation exists in Mel-
nychuk.82 In Eker, the court does not make any specific remarks on the subject. This is 
only logical, as the case was not concerned with the question of whether the refusal to 
publish a reply violated convention rights. Moreover, the case dealt with a reply that 
had already been published. 
Nevertheless, this question has the potential to cause upset in the United King-
dom (‘UK’). With the press primarily being subject to self-regulation, there is no statu-
tory right of reply regarding the press in the UK.83 Thus, it would be interesting to see 
how the ECtHR would decide an application claiming that the status quo violates con-
vention rights. 
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To date, two self-regulatory bodies, the ‘Independent Press Standards Organisation 
(IPSO), and the Independent Monitor of the Press (IMPRESS), have been established. 
Whereas IMPRESS has been recognised as an ‘approved regulator’ by the ‘Press 
Recognition Panel’, under powers granted by Royal Charter,84 IPSO has not sought ap-
proval and is unlikely to do so in the future. This objection is based on its members 
‘theological objection to the Royal Charter’,85 and its aim of not having any formal link 
with the state or the government.86  
Most importantly for the purpose of this article, IMPRESS has made a deliberate 
decision against requiring publishers to give individuals a ‘so-called right of reply’.87 In 
contrast, IPSO enforces the Editors’ Code of Practice,88 which includes an ‘opportunity 
to reply’ in Clause 1(iii) ‘when reasonably called for’. This is a post-publication right of 
reply, which means that publishers are not under a duty to contact affected individuals 
prior to publication.89 Ultimately, the ECtHR may have to determine whether fulfilling 
the positive obligation requires a new statutory remedy or whether the existing remedies 
are sufficient.90  
4.6.2 For television content? 
So far, all applications under the ECHR have concerned the right of reply in the ‘tradi-
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86 John Lloyd, ‘Regulate yourself’ (2015) 86(3) The Political Quarterly 393. 
87 IMPRESS, 'Guidance on the IMPRESS Standards Code' (2017), p  
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tional print media’. Thus, it is uncertain whether the ECtHR would extend the positive 
obligation upon member states to provide this remedy to other sectors such as broadcast 
television.91  
However, from the perspective of the UK, such a duty is already provided by 
European Union (‘EU’) legislation. Article 28 of EU Directive 2010/13/EU, the Audio-
visual Media Services (AVMS) Directive,92 requires member states to give ‘any natural 
or legal person, regardless of nationality, whose legitimate interests, in particular repu-
tation and good name, have been damaged by an assertion of incorrect facts in a televi-
sion programme’ a right of reply or an ‘equivalent’ remedy. Here, too, the obligation 
falls short of requiring an individual right of response. 
In the UK, the ‘Office for Communications’ (Ofcom), the regulatory body for 
broadcast television and radio,93 has statutory powers under the Communications Act 
2003.94 The act imposes on Ofcom the duty to draw up a code for broadcast television 
and radio, the ‘Ofcom Broadcasting Code’,95 which covers standards in programmes, 
sponsorship, product placement in television programmes, fairness and privacy.96 In this 
context, it is crucial to note that, as of 3 April 2017, Ofcom also became the BBC’s first 
independent external regulator.97 As a result, BBC programmes are also regulated by 
the rules in Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code.98  
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Section 7.11 of the Code requires that ‘If a programme alleges wrongdoing or incompe-
tence or makes other significant allegations, those concerned should normally be given 
an appropriate and timely opportunity to respond.’99 In practice, this provision results in 
a duty for television broadcasters to contact an individual or organisation that might be 
affected by any significant allegation prior to the broadcast in order to allow them to 
respond properly in the programme.100 In case this opportunity is not provided, Ofcom 
has the statutory power to sanction the broadcaster.101 Further, the regulator may direct 
the broadcaster to broadcast a summary of its findings, a correction or both in such form 
as Ofcom may determine.102 The Code thus complies with the general requirement in 
the AVMS Directive to provide a right of reply ‘or equivalent remedy’ but, as with the 
press codes in the UK, falls short of affording individuals a general right to have a re-
sponse published in their own terms. It remains to be determined whether provision of 
this type would fulfil the positive obligation to provide a right of reply under Articles 8 
and 10 of the ECHR. 
4.6.3 For online content? 
Nor is it clear whether the ECtHR would extend the positive obligation upon member 
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states to provide a right of reply (or equivalent remedy) to online content. Such pro-
posals have been countered with the concern that if the remedy is too broad it could 
‘shoehorn’ the internet into a bureaucratic model of statement and counterstatement 
more appropriate to a ‘set of litigation pleadings than to a vibrant discussion medi-
um.’103 
The still ongoing process of revising the AVMS Directive illustrates how reluc-
tant law makers are to extend a right of reply to online content.104 Although the current 
Directive extends to both traditional linear ‘television broadcasts’ and non-linear ‘on-
demand audiovisual media services’,105 different rules apply to linear and non-linear 
audiovisual media content, including Article 28. As mentioned above, this provision 
requires a right of reply or an equivalent remedy for statements made in a broadcast 
television programme, but does not apply to on-demand content.106 
On 25 May 2016, the European Commission published a proposal for an amend-
ed directive,107 and, in a working paper accompanying the proposal, the Commission 
evaluatedthe stakeholder responses it had received, including in relation to the scope of 
the right of reply.108 The majority of respondents across stakeholder categories consid-
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ered the existing rules to be still ‘relevant, effective and fair’.109 Eight member states, 
including the UK,110 and nine regulators were in favour of maintaining the status quo, 
whereas two member states and six regulators called for an extension to the scope of the 
right to on-demand audiovisual media services and online intermediaries.111  
Consequently, the European Commission did not propose an extension to the 
scope of the remedy to non-linear on-demand content.112 However, on 25 April 2017, 
the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (‘CULT’) voted to 
amend the proposal for an updated EU AVMS Directive.113 As the CULT has also voted 
to open interinstitutional ‘Trilogue talks’ with a view to adopting the directive as soon 
as possible,114 it cannot be foreseen whether the final version of the Directive will ex-
tend the scope of the right of reply. Nevertheless, given the stakeholders’ responses and 
the content of the Council of the European Union’s general approach on the revised 
version of the AVMS directive,115 it seems more likely that the status quo will prevail.  
So, should this distinction between linear and non-linear content be upheld? A 
comprehensive discussion of all arguments put forward goes beyond the scope of this 
article. 116 Primarily, the EU justifies the somewhat lighter regulation of on-demand 
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content by reference to the user’s degree of control. The law-maker claims that users of 
linear services are more likely to be confronted, unexpectedly, with potentially disturb-
ing material than viewers of on-demand services,117 the latter requiring an additional 
two or three clicks of a remote control or computer mouse to access.118 However, this 
position has been questioned in the light of the ongoing convergence between both 
types of content,119 as well as the increasing popularity of on-demand services.120 Nor is 
it clear how this distinction relates to the right of reply. 
It is suggested that a right of reply or equivalent remedy should at least be avail-
able in relation to on-demand services offered by television broadcasters that primarily 
recycle previously broadcast content online.121 In the case where a ‘traditional broad-
caster’ offers viewers the opportunity to watch the same programmes on demand, there 
do not appear to be strong arguments for regulating the two services differently, in par-
ticular, because of the mode of delivery.122 
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In fact, this approach can already be seen to be partially applied in practice. In the UK, 
the scope of Ofcom’s ‘opportunity to respond’ extends to the ‘BBC UK On Demand 
Programme Services funded by the licence fee (‘BBC ODPS’)’.123 However, there is at 
present no right of reply or equivalent for on-demand content provided by an on-
demand service provider other than the BBC.124  
On a different note, extending the positive obligation to ‘press-like’ online con-
tent seems a logical conclusion as the internet is not a legal vacuum and is able to reach 
more people than traditional newspapers.125 One option, in line with the more limited 
proposals relating to television programme content above, would be to limit the scope 
of the right to ‘press-like’ websites focusing completely, or partially on reproducing 
texts or visual content of existing print media.126 This is not unheard of as, for example, 
IPSO also regulates websites and apps, including text, pictures, video, audio/visual, and 
interactive content produced by its members with a print footprint. But IPSO in fact 
goes even further and regulates editorial content on electronic services operated by 
members where there is no print presence. Including such content within the scope of 
the remedy would conform to the recommendation made by the Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers in 2004.127 In this recommendation, the Council called for a 
right of reply extending to ‘any means of communication for the periodic dissemination 
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to the public of edited information, whether on-line or off-line, such as newspapers, 
periodicals, radio, television and web-based news services.’128 The emphasis on the 
editorial aspect and focus on news could be one way of keeping the right within man-
ageable bounds. 
Ultimately, the judges in Eker have stressed the importance of this remedy for 
protecting personality rights and enhancing public discourse on several occasions. 
Therefore, it seems likely that the court would apply its jurisprudence to other media 
content too, potentially going beyond repurposed content to online only content falling 
within the scope of the 2004 recommendation.  
5. Who should be able to exercise a right of reply? 
The findings in Eker raise the question of whether a right of reply should also be availa-
ble to those who are not referred to in a statement but nevertheless wish to contribute to 
the debate. Given that the judges found the remedy’s normative foundation to rest both 
in Article 8 and Article 10 ECHR,129 different answers may be given to this question. 
From an Article 8 point of view, it seems logical to only allow individuals to file a reply 
if they are affected and referred to by a statement.130 This is (partly) underpinned by the 
judgment. Indeed, when discussing Article 8, the court solely referred to the person that 
the ‘information or opinions disseminated by the means of mass communication’ are 
directed at.131  
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However, as analysed in section 4.2, the ECtHR highlighted that the right of reply is 
also a founded on free speech in general and media pluralism in particular in order to 
‘allow the challenge of false information’ and ‘ensure a plurality of opinions’.132 There-
fore, one could argue that based on a public interest to guarantee a reliable media cover-
age and enhance public discourse, civil society organisations, knowledgeable individu-
als or others who could increase the public debate on a specific topic should also be able 
to exercise the right to reply even if a statement did not refer to them. The problem is 
that the judges in Eker failed to clarify which aim is more important: achieving media 
pluralism or protecting individual personal rights. 
Ultimately, it is suggested that a right of reply should not be unduly broadened 
to those who are not referred to. First, allowing a third-party to call for a reply would 
strengthen the potential ‘chilling effect’ on the freedom of the media. As acknowledged 
by the court,133 a right of reply interferes with editorial independence since it dictates to 
the editor what to publish in his or her newspaper. In addition, it might even lead to a 
publisher to promote a point of view he or she does not agree with.134 Thus, limiting the 
exercise of the right to those who are referred to ensures that this restriction on the free-
dom of the media is kept within proportionate bounds.  
Second, enabling anyone interested in a subject to make use of a right of reply 
might undermine the rights of those who are referred to in the statement in question. 
The interest of the affected person in making a reply might differ from those of third 
parties such as a public pressure group. This may negate the remedy’s aim of protecting 
the individual’s rights under Article 8.  
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These arguments are underpinned by the fact that the ECtHR, so far, has not recognised 
a positive obligation for states to provide the right of reply for anyone but the person 
referred to by a statement made in the press.135 Therefore, achieving media pluralism 
should be seen as a subordinate goal of the right of reply in comparison to protecting the 
individual’s rights. Ultimately, limiting the exercise of a right of reply to those who are 
referred to is the practice in most member states.136 
In the UK, for example, IPSO will not consider a third-party request for an op-
portunity to reply and will strike out the request if the article is not directed at the com-
plainant.137 With regard to broadcast programmes, Ofcom is ‘normally’ under a duty not 
to entertain a complaint unless it is made by the ‘person affected’ or by a person author-
ised by him or her to make the complaint on their behalf.138 
6. Concluding remarks 
The ECtHR in Eker has given clear guidance on the procedural expectations it has for 
domestic courts, expressly exempting right of reply proceedings from the need to hold a 
public hearing. Perhaps even more importantly, it has now confirmed that the normative 
foundation of the right of reply lies both in Article 8 and Article 10 ECHR. As argued 
above, this outcome strengthens the position of the person seeking a reply against the 
media. In particular, the court has opened the door to including criticism of the publish-
er in the reply, which has to be published in the same forum as the statement that gave 
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rise to the application.139 This is so, even though the veracity of the content of the reply 
or the statements that gave rise to it do not have to be proven. 
However, Eker failed to give clear guidance on where exactly it draws the line 
between admissible and inadmissible criticism. This results in a state of uncertainty for 
individuals, publishers and domestic courts. In particular, a right of reply without clear 
boundaries runs the risk of having a ‘chilling effect’ on the (editorial) freedom of the 
press. This may cause the press to refrain from publishing any controversial statements 
or, indeed, opinions, which the Court appears to accept could also trigger the right. As 
one of the right of reply’s main aims is to guarantee pluralism of information,140 this 
would contradict the purpose of the remedy.  
In consequence, a ‘level playing field’ between the publisher and the affected 
person must take into account not only the individual’s rights but also the newspaper’s 
interests. As argued in section 5, the right should only be available to those referred to 
in the statement in question in order to make it predictable and limit its potential 
‘chilling effect’. On the other hand, limiting the right to a retraction by the publisher of 
incorrect facts would go too far, as adding the affected individual’s viewpoint is one of 
the key characteristics of this remedy. Further, any changes to the status quo that would 
result in an investigation into the truth or falsity of the statement complained about or 
the reply itself must be resisted. Such amendments could result not only in lengthy pro-
ceedings but also endanger the remedy’s prompt and timely nature, one of its most val-
uable characteristics. 
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